Soc. When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all？
Phaedr. Certainly.
Soc. But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves？
Phaedr. Precisely.
Soc. Then in some things we agree, but not in others？
Phaedr. That is true.
Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power？
Phaedr. Clearly, in the uncertain class.
Soc. Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err？
Phaedr. He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.
Soc. Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred.
Phaedr. Certainly.
Soc. Now to which class does love belong-to the debatable or tothe undisputed class？
Phaedr. To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good？
Soc. Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech？ for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot well remember.
Phaedr. Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake.
Soc. Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. Alas! how inferior to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement of his lover"s speech did insist on our supposing love to be something or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again:
Phaedr. If you please; but you will not find what you want.
Soc, Read, that I may have his exact words.
Phaedr. ”You know how matters stand with and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover, for loversrepent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love isover.”
Soc. Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus？
Phaedr. Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end.
Soc. Then as to the other topics-are they not thrown down anyhow？ Is there any principle in them？ Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic？ I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition？
Phaedr. You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition.
Soc. At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole？
Phaedr. Certainly.
Soc. Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias？ See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas thePhrygian.
Phaedr. What is there remarkable in the epitaph？
Soc. It is as follows:-I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas;So long as water flows and tall trees grow,So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding,I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below.
Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.
Phaedr. You are making fun of that oration of ours.
Soc. Well, I will say no more about your friend"s speech lest I should give offence to you; although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric.
Phaedr. In what way？
Soc. The two speeches, as you may remember, were unlike-I the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted.
Phaedr. And right manfully.
Soc. You should rather say ”madly”; and madness was the argumentof them, for, as I said, ”love is a madness.”
Phaedr. Yes.
Soc. And of madness there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention.
Phaedr. True.
Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the deion of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain.
Phaedr. I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you.
Soc. Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise.
Phaedr. What do you mean？
Soc. I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer deion if art couldgive us one.
Phaedr. What are they？
Soc. First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear.
Phaedr. What is the other principle, Socrates？