Ath. That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad againsthis will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be doneinvoluntarily is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains thatinjustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injusticeinvoluntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily,and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjustagainst their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do notagree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent withmyself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me-Well, Stranger,if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of theMagnetes-shall we legislate or not-what do you advise? Certainly wewill, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what arevoluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make thepunishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for theinvoluntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, underthe idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?
Cle. Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to theseobjections?
Ath. That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us-Cle. Do what?
Ath. Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that ourideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory.
Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once morewhether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we everdetermined in what respect these two classes of actions differ fromone another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever,two kinds of actions have been distinguished-the one, voluntary, theother, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly.
But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be onlyspoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification ofitself? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation?
Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove thatthey are two, and what is the difference between them, that when weimpose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal,and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly orunfitly inflicted.
Cle. I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain:
either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or wemust show the meaning and truth of this statement.
Ath. Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable-notto speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful andunholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntaryand involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinctionbetween them.
Cle. Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us uponthat point.
Ath. Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by thecitizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affordingplentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts areinjuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds-one, voluntary, andthe other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quiteas many and as great as the voluntary? And please to considerwhether I am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for Ideny, Cleinias and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarilydoes him an injury involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such anact under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury.
But I should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, isnot an injury at all; and, on the other hand, if I am right, when abenefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often besaid to injure. For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere givingor taking away of anything is not to be described either as just orunjust; but the legislator has to consider whether mankind do goodor harm to one another out of a just principle and intention. On thedistinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye; and whenthere is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law,and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen,and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensationhas been given for injustice, the law must always seek to win over thedoers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity tothose of friendship.
Cle. Very good.
Ath. Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing theinjustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as arecapable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; andthe cure of injustice will take the following direction.
Cle. What direction?
Ath. When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the lawwill admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again,or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he mustin addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained byword or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking awayprivileges, by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the lawshall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate thenature of the just-this is quite the noblest work of law. But if thelegislator sees any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint alaw and a penalty. He knows quite well that to such men themselvesthere is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that theywould do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would take theirdeparture, inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not tooffend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. In suchcases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to inflict deathas the punishment of offences.
Cle. What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, butwill you favour me by stating a little more clearly the differencebetween hurt and injustice, and the various complications of thevoluntary and involuntary which enter into them?