Ath. And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would it be animprovement on the present state of things?
Cle. A very great improvement, if the customs which prevail amongthem were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such asyou were just now saying ought to prevail.
Ath. Let us see whether we understand one another:-Are not theprinciples of education and music which prevail among you asfollows: you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he betemperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he begreat and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor;and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras orMidas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery? As thepoet says, and with truth: I sing not, I care not about him whoaccomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him who"draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a justman." But if he be unjust, I would not have him "look calmly uponbloody death," nor "surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas"; and letno other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of whichthe many speak are not really good: first in the catalogue is placedhealth, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as forexample to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to haveall the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as youlike; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquiredall these things, and when you have acquired them to become at onceimmortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all thesethings are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all,including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to havesight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at allwithout justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all theso-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life beimmortal; but not so great, if the bad man lives only a very shorttime. These are the truths which, if I am not mistaken, you willpersuade or compel your poets to utter with suitable accompaniments ofharmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am Inot right? For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed aregoods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods aretruly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Areyou and I agreed about this?
Cle. I think that we partly agree and partly do not.
Ath. When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts, andwhen he is preeminent in strength and courage, and has the gift ofimmortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balancethese goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature-ofsuch an one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he ismiserable rather than happy.
Cle. That is quite true.
Ath. Once more: Suppose that he be valiant and strong, andhandsome and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever helikes, still, if he be unrighteous and insolent, would not both of youagree that he will of necessity live basely? You will surely grantso much?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And an evil life too?
Cle. I am not equally disposed to grant that.
Ath. Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?
Cle. How can I possibly say so?
Ath. How! Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now weare of two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying isas plain as the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were alawgiver, I would try to make the poets and all the citizens speakin this strain, and I would inflict the heaviest penalties on anyone in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad menwho lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is onething, and the just another; and there are many other matters aboutwhich I should make my citizens speak in a manner different from theCretans and Lacedaemonians of this age, and I may say, indeed, fromthe world in general. For tell me, my good friends, by Zeus and Apollotell me, if I were to ask these same Gods who were your legislators-Isnot the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there two lives,one of which is the justest and the other the pleasantest?-and theywere to reply that there are two; and thereupon I proceeded to ask,(that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry), Which are thehappier-those who lead the justest, or those who lead thepleasantest life? and they replied, Those who lead thepleasantest-that would be a very strange answer, which I should notlike to put into the mouth of the Gods. The words will come withmore propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and thereforeI will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him tosay again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest.
And to that I rejoin:-O my father, did you not wish me to live ashappily as possible? And yet you also never ceased telling me that Ishould live as justly as possible. Now, here the giver of the rule,whether he be legislator or father, will be in a dilemma, and willin vain endeavour to be consistent with himself. But if he were todeclare that the justest life is also the happiest, every onehearing him would enquire, if I am not mistaken, what is that good andnoble principle in life which the law approves, and which issuperior to pleasure. For what good can the just man have which isseparated from pleasure? Shall we say that glory and fame, coming fromGods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant,and infamy pleasant? Certainly not, sweet legislator. Or shall wesay that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done isgood and honourable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that thedoing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base?
Cle. Impossible.