and ”life” are not the same：for if coming—to—be be contrary toperishing，then a particular form of perishing will have aparticular form of coming—to—be as its contrary：now death is aparticular form of perishing and is contrary to life：life，therefore,is a coming to—be，and to live is to come—to—be.But this isimpossible：accordingly，the ”soul” and ”life” are not the same.Nowthis is not proved：for the impossibility results all the same，evenif one does not say that life is the same as the soul，but merely saysthat life is contrary to death，which is a form of perishing，and thatperishing has ”coming—to—be” as its contrary.Arguments of thatkind，then，though not inconclusive absolutely，are inconclusive inrelation to the proposed conclusion.Also even the questionersthemselves often fail quite as much to see a point of that kind.
Such，then，are the arguments that depend upon the consequent andupon false cause.Those that depend upon the making of two questionsinto one occur whenever the plurality is undetected and a singleanswer is returned as if to a single question.Now，in some cases,it is easy to see that there is more than one，and that an answer isnot to be given，e.g.”Does the earth consist of sea，or the sky?” Butin some cases it is less easy，and then people treat the question asone，and either confess their defeat by failing to answer thequestion，or are exposed to an apparent refutation.Thus ”Is A andis B a man?”Yes.”Then if any one hits A and B，he will strike aman” (singular),”not men” (plural).Or again，where part is good andpart bad，”is the whole good or bad?” For whichever he says，it ispossible that he might be thought to expose himself to an apparentrefutation or to make an apparently false statement：for to say thatsomething is good which is not good，or not good which is good，isto make a false statement.Sometimes，however，additional premissesmay actually give rise to a genuine refutation; e.g.suppose a manwere to grant that the descriptions ”white” and ”naked” and ”blind”
apply to one thing and to a number of things in a like sense.For if”blind” describes a thing that cannot see though nature designed it tosee，it will also describe things that cannot see though naturedesigned them to do so.Whenever，then，one thing can see whileanother cannot，they will either both be able to see or else both beblind; which is impossible.
The right way，then，is either to divide apparent proofs andrefutations as above，or else to refer them all to ignorance of what”refutation” is，and make that our starting—point：for it ispossible to analyse all the aforesaid modes of fallacy into breachesof the definition of a refutation.In the first place，we may see ifthey are inconclusive：for the conclusion ought to result from thepremisses laid down，so as to compel us necessarily to state it andnot merely to seem to compel us.Next we should also take thedefinition bit by bit，and try the fallacy thereby.For of thefallacies that consist in language，some depend upon a double meaning,e.g.ambiguity of words and of phrases，and the fallacy of like verbalforms (for we habitually speak of everything as though it were aparticular substance)—while fallacies of combination and divisionand accent arise because the phrase in question or the term as alteredis not the same as was intended.Even this，however，should be thesame，just as the thing signified should be as well，if a refutationor proof is to be effected; e.g.if the point concerns a doublet，thenyou should draw the conclusion of a ”doublet”，not of a ”cloak”.Forthe former conclusion also would be true，but it has not beenproved; we need a further question to show that ”doublet” means thesame thing，in order to satisfy any one who asks why you think yourpoint proved.
Fallacies that depend on Accident are clear cases of ignoratioelenchi when once ”proof” has been defined.For the same definitionought to hold good of ”refutation” too，except that a mention of”the contradictory” is here added：for a refutation is a proof ofthe contradictory.If，then，there is no proof as regards anaccident of anything，there is no refutation.For supposing，when Aand B are，C must necessarily be，and C is white，there is nonecessity for it to be white on account of the syllogism.So，if thetriangle has its angles equal to two right—angles，and it happens tobe a figure，or the simplest element or starting point，it is notbecause it is a figure or a starting point or simplest element that ithas this character.For the demonstration proves the point about itnot qua figure or qua simplest element，but qua triangle.Likewisealso in other cases.If，then，refutation is a proof，an argumentwhich argued per accidens could not be a refutation.It is，however,just in this that the experts and men of science generally sufferrefutation at the hand of the unscientific：for the latter meet thescientists with reasonings constituted per accidens; and thescientists for lack of the power to draw distinctions either say ”Yes”
to their questions，or else people suppose them to have said ”Yes”,although they have not.
Those that depend upon whether something is said in a certainrespect only or said absolutely，are clear cases of ignoratioelenchi because the affirmation and the denial are not concernedwith the same point.For of ”white in a certain respect” thenegation is ”not white in a certain respect”，while of ”whiteabsolutely” it is ”not white，absolutely”.If，then，a man treatsthe admission that a thing is ”white in a certain respect” as thoughit were said to be white absolutely，he does not effect arefutation，but merely appears to do so owing to ignorance of whatrefutation is.
The clearest cases of all，however，are those that were previouslydescribed” as depending upon the definition of a ”refutation”：andthis is also why they were called by that name.For the appearanceof a refutation is produced because of the omission in the definition,and if we divide fallacies in the above manner，we ought to set”Defective definition” as a common mark upon them all.