Soc.Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure?
Pro.I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of having them all, if only you have the first sort.
Soc.Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically terms "a meeting of the waters"?
Pro.By all means.
Soc.There-I have let him in, and now I must return to the fountain of pleasure.For we were not permitted to begin by mingling in a single stream the true portions of both according to our original intention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the sciences flow in together before the pleasures.
Pro.Quite true.
Soc.And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first only the true ones.
Pro.It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones first.
Soc.Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?
Pro.Yes, the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to mingle.
Soc.The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all mingle?
Pro.What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?
Soc.Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom to answer for themselves.
Pro.How?
Soc.Tell us, O beloved-shall we call you pleasures or by some other name?-would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows:
Pro.How?
Soc.They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves in every respect.
Pro.And our answer will be:-In that ye have spoken well.
Soc.Very true.And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will reply:-"What pleasures do you mean?"Pro.Likely enough.
Soc.And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones? "Why, Socrates," they will say, "how can we? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess has in her train to follow her about wherever she goes,-mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of sense in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good-there would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup."-Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion?
Pro.Most certainly.
Soc.And still there must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every mixture.
Pro.What is that?
Soc.Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist.
Pro.Impossible.
Soc.Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.
Pro.I agree with you, Socrates.
Soc.And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good?
Pro.I think that we are.
Soc.What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind.
Pro.Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge.
Soc.And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.
Pro.What do you mean?
Soc.Every man knows it.
Pro.What?
Soc.He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which brings confusion on the possessor of it.
Pro.Most true.
Soc.And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over.
Pro.True.
Soc.Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture.
Pro.Certainly.