With the fall of the French Empire, the object of the greatalliance ceased.From that time forth, the Continental powers weremenaced neither by the revolutionary tendencies nor by the lust ofconquest of France.England's predominance in manufactures,navigation, commerce, colonial possessions, and naval power, had,on the other hand, enormously increased during the conflictsagainst the Revolution and against the French conquest.From thattime forth, it became the interest of the Continental powers toally themselves with France against the commercial and navalpredominance.Solely from fear of the skin of the dead lion, theContinental powers did not heed sufficiently the living leopard whohad hitherto fought in their ranks.The Holy Alliance was apolitical error.
This error also brought about its own punishment through therevolution of Italy.The Holy Alliance had unnecessarily calledinto life a counter force which no longer existed, or which atleast would not for a long time have revived again.Fortunately forthe Continental powers, the dynasty of July contrived to appeasethe revolutionary tendency in France.France concluded the alliancewith England in the interests of the dynasty of July and ofstrengthening the constitutional monarchy.England concluded it inthe interest of the maintenance of her commercial supremacy.
The Franco-English alliance ceased as soon as ever the dynastyof July and the constitutional monarchy in France felt themselvesto be sufficiently firmly established; but, on the other hand, theinterests of France in respect of naval power, navigation,commerce, industry, and foreign possessions came again more to thefront.It is clear that France has again an equal interest with theother Continental powers in these questions, and the establishingof a Continental alliance against the naval predominance of Englandappears to be becoming a question of the day, provided the dynastyof July can succeed in creating perfect unity of will between thedifferent organs of State administration, also to thrust into thebackground those territorial questions which are excited by therevolutionary tendencies, and entirely to appease in the minds ofthe monarchical Continental powers the fear of the tendencies ofFrance towards revolution and aggression.
Nothing, however, at this time so greatly impedes a closerunion of the continent of Europe as the fact that the centre of itstill never takes the position for which it is naturally fitted.
Instead of being a mediator between the east and the west of thatcontinent, on all questions of arrangement of territory, of theprinciple of their constitutions, of national independence andpower, for which it is qualified by its geographical position, byits federal constitution which excludes all apprehension ofaggression in the minds of neighbouring nations, by its religioustoleration, and its cosmopolitical tendencies, and finally by itscivilisation and the elements of power which it possesses, thiscentral part of Europe constitutes at present the apple of discordfor which the east and the west contend, while each party hopes todraw to its own side this middle power, which is weakened by wantof national unity, and is always uncertainly wavering hither andthither.
If, on the other hand, Germany could constitute itself with themaritime territories which appertain to it, with Holland, Belgium,and Switzerland, as a powerful commercial and political whole -- ifthis mighty national body could fuse representative institutionswith the existing monarchical, dynastic, and aristocraticinterests, so far as these are compatible with one another -- thenGermany could secure peace to the continent of Europe for a longtime, and at the same time constitute herself the central point ofa durable Continental alliance.
That the naval power of England greatly exceeds that of allother nations, if not on the number of ships, yet certainly infighting power -- that hence the nations which are less powerful atsea can only match England at sea by uniting their own naval power,is clear.From hence it follows, that every nation which is lesspowerful at sea has an interest in the maintenance and prosperityof the naval power of all other nations who are similarly weak atsea; and further, that fractions of other nations which, hithertodivided, have possessed either no naval power whatever or only anunimportant one, should constitute themselves into one united navalpower.In regard to England, France and North America sustain lossif the naval power of Russia declines, and vice vers? They allgain, if Germany, Holland, and Belgium constitute together a commonnaval power; for while separated these last are mere satellites tothe supremacy of England, but if united they strengthen theopposition to that supremacy of all nations at sea.
None of these less powerful nations possesses a mercantilemarine which exceeds the requirements of its own internationaltrade -- none of these nations possesses a manufacturing powerwhich would maintain important preponderance over that of theothers.None of them, therefore, has any ground to fear thecompetition of the others.On the other hand, all have a commoninterest in protecting themselves against the destructivecompetition of England.Hence it must be to the interests of allthat the predominating manufacturing power of England should losethose means of access (Holland, Belgium, and the Hanse Towns) bymeans of which England has hitherto dominated the markets of theContinent.