His view of space and time is taken from Newton and Clarke.He represents them as not beings, but the affections of beings: " And as time and space are not existences, so their correlate infinites (if I may say so), that is, eternity and immensity, are not existences, but the properties of necessary existence." In some other of his statements, be goes back to some of the mystic statements of the schoolmen, and anticipates some of the doctrines of Kant."God's existence is unsuccessive." He says, "<Nunc stans> implies opposite ideas, if applied to our existence;but if we allow an eternal and immutable mind, the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind, and the phrase has propriety." But surely there is an inconsistency in first arguing the divine existence from our ideas of space and time, and then declaring that our ideas in regard to space and time do not apply to Deity.
In maintaining that mind is ever active, he has to consider its seeming dormancy in sleep."The soul in sleep seems to suffer something like what happens to a live coal covered up under ashes; which is alive all the while, but only appears so when disencumbered and exposed to open air."As to what has since been called unconscious mental action, his theory of it is the same as that defended in after years by D.Stewart; he supposes {48} that the mind was conscious of its action at the time, but that the memory could not recall it."There is certainly a great deal of our past consciousness which we retain no memory of afterwards.It is a particular part of our finite and imperfect nature, that we cannot become Conscious of all our past consciousness at pleasure.But no man at night would infer that he was not in a state of consciousness and thinking at such a certain minute, about twelve o'clock of the day, because now perhaps he hath no memory what particular thought be had at that minute.And it is no better argument, considered in itself, that a man was not conscious at such a minute in his sleep because next morning he hath no memory of what ideas were in his mind then."Baxter was most earnest in restricting the properties of matter, but he was equally resolute in maintaining its existence.In his work on the soul he has a long section on " Dean Berkeley's scheme." He was one of the first who examined systematically the new theory.He takes the obvious and vulgar view of it, and not the refined one ascribed to the ingenious author by his admirers: for those who have opposed Berkeley have usually given one account of his system, while those who have defended him have usually given another; and some have thence come to the conclusion, that his whole theory is so ethereal that it is not capable of definite expression.Baxter maintains that " we perceive, besides our sensations themselves, the objects of them that " we are conscious not only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by some cause beside ourselves," and that "such objects as rivers, houses, mountains, are the very things we perceive by sense." He endeavors to prove that the system of Berkeley carried out consistently would land us in a solitary egoism, for " we only collect concerning the souls of other men from the spontaneous motions and actions of their bodies; these, according to him, belong to nothing." Berkeley had boasted that, by expelling matter out of nature, he had dragged with it so many sceptical and impious notions; Baxter replies that this " puts us into a way of denying all things, that we may get rid of the absurdity of those who deny some things," -- " as if one should advance that the best way for a woman who may silence those who attack her reputation is to turn a common prostitute." He thinks that the doctrine may tend to remove the checks to immorality; for "he who thinks theft, murder, or adultery nothing real beyond bare idea, and that for aught we know be injures nobody, will be surely under less restraint to satisfy his Declinations of any kind." The mathematician is evidently annoyed and vexed at the attacks which Berkeley bad made on his science, and shows "that if there be no such thing as quantity, we have a large body of immutable truths conversant about an impossible object."In examining Berkeley he gives his views of sense-perception, which are not so clear and satisfactory as those of Reid; but are vastly juster than those of his contemporaries.He distinctly separates himself from those who hold that the mind can perceive nothing but its own states." If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive parts, it is plain we perceive something more than our own perceptions." He adds "We are conscious that we perceive parts as that we have perceptions at all." The {49}
existence of matter in general, or at least of material sensories to which the soul is united, seems to me to be nearer intuitive than demonstrative knowledge." He declares that the "same perception of parts proves to us both the spirit and a material agency." This is so far an anticipation of the doctrine of Hamilton as an advance upon that of Reid.As to the manner of the action of matter on spirit, and spirit on matter, he says, in the very spirit of Reid." We are certain this is matter of fact in many instances, whether we conceive it or not." He adds, in his own manner: " The Deity himself moves matter in almost all the phenomena of nature, and the soul of man perhaps moves some matter of the body, though in an infinitely less degree."