He treats from Chap.XVI.-XXII.of the active powers of the mind, or the powers which excite to action.All throughout, he gains a delusive simplicity, simply by overlooking an element, commonly the main element, in the phenomenon.Desire is the same thing as the idea of a pleasure, " and the number of our desires is the same with that of our pleasurable sensations; the number of our aversions, the same with that of our painful sensations."Ihold that desire is something superadded to mere sensation, and indicating a higher capacity, and that we may and ought to desire many things beside mere sensations of pleasure.He then proceeds to show us in the way the Scottish metaphysicians had done, from Hutcheson and Turnbull downwards; how the desire of pleasure gives rise to other impulses, which may by association become ends, and not mere means; such as, wealth, power, dignity, friendship, kindness, family, country, party, mankind.A man looks upon his child as a cause to him of future pains and pleasures, much more certain than any other person; " and thus gathers round it a whole host of associations that constitute parental love.All this I admit will mingle with and strengthen family affection; but in the heart of the affection there is a natural {387} love on the part of parents for their children.In accounting for the love of beauty, he takes advantage of Alison's theory, a theory not favored by those who have discovered mathematical relations in beautiful forms.The following quotation will en able us to understand what he means by motives: "As every pleasure is worth having, -- for otherwise it would not be a pleasure, -- the idea of every pleasure associated with that of an action of ours as the cause is a motive; that is, leads to the action.But every motive does not produce the action.The reason is, the existence of other motives which prevent it.A man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend: the composition of the motive is obvious.He does not obey the motive.Why? He obeys other motives which are stronger.Though pleasures are associated with the immoral act, pains are associated with it also; the pains of the injured husband, the pains of the injured wife, the moral indignation of man kind, the future reproaches of his own mind.Some men obey the first rather than the second motive.The reason is obvious.In them the association of the act with the pleasure is, from habit, unduly strong: the association of the act with the pains is, from want of habit, unduly weak.This is a case of education." I believe that if men were trained to think that chastity has no other foundation than Mr.Mill has given it, the husband would be little attended to when he claimed to be injured, and the wife would cease to believe that she had injured any one, and the moral indignation of mankind would disappear; thus perilous would it be to remove morality from its foundation in moral principle, and place it on the shifting sand of association.
We are prepared for his analysis of the moral sense.
"It is interesting here to observe by what a potent call we are summoned to virtue.Of all that we enjoy more is derived from those acts of other men on which we bestow the name Ivirtue,' than from any other cause.Our own virtue is the principal cause why other men reciprocate the acts of virtue towards us: with the idea of our own acts of virtue there are naturally associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous acts of our fellow-creatures.When this association is formed in due strength, which it is the main business of a good education to effect, the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast."By all means let us try to collect {388} good associations round virtuous acts; but, as the centre and bond of the whole, let us have the principle that virtuous acts should be done because they are right.Discard this restraint, and attractive associations will be sure to gather round vice.
He tells us (" Fragment on Mackintosh "), that his analysis of virtue into the love of pleasure and association does not lessen the influence of the motive." Gratitude remains gratitude, resentment remains resentment, generosity, generosity in the mind of him who feels them, after analysis, the same as before." Yes in the mind of him " who feels them; " but the feeling may be undermined, and remorse for sin be quieted.
He closes the work with a discussion as to will and intention.Will is the peculiar state of mind or consciousness by which action is preceded.He treats of its influence over the actions of the body, and over the actions of the mind.He shows that sensations and ideas are the true antecedents of the bodily actions, and so he does not need to call in a separate capacity called the will.He then turns to the power which the mind seems to possess over its associations.He proves, as Brown and others had done, that we cannot will an absent idea before us, -- for to will it is already to have it; and the recalling is always a process of association.He does not see that, by a stern act of will, we can detain a present thought, and thus gather around it a whole host of associations.He speaks of ends, but has no idea of the way in which ends spring up and influence the mind.He takes no notice of the essential freedom belonging to the will, and thus leaves no ground on which to rear the doctrine of human responsibility.