Bain has done, on the sensations of disorganization in the alimentary canal.He then treats of idea (Chap.II.); and now " we have two classes of feelings, one which exists when the object of sense is present, another that exists after the object of sense has ceased to be present.The one class of feelings I call sensations; the other class of feelings Icall ideas." At this stage we wonder where or how he has got objects of sense with nothing but sensations and ideas." As we say sensation, we might also say ideation: " " sensation would in that case be a general name for one part of our constitution, {380} ideation for another." It is clear that Mill's analysis has been the main book, or the only book on mental science, care fully studied by a certain class of London physiologists, -- such as Carpenter, Huxley, and Maudesley, -- who seldom rise above the contemplation of sensations and sensations reproduced.Verily it is an easy way of enunciating and unfolding all the varied processes of the mind to represent them as feelings, and put them under two heads, sensations and ideas; the ideas being copies of sensations, so that he is able to say: " There is nothing in the mind but sensations and copies of sensations." There is no room left for knowledge of objects or belief in objects, internal and external, no judgment or reasoning, no perception of moral good and evil.It is a more inadequate resolution than that of Condillac, who called in a sort of alchemical power, and spoke of "transformed sensations." Mr.
Grote writes to the younger Mill: " It has always rankled in my thoughts that so grand and powerful a mind as he should have left behind it such insufficient traces in the estimation of successors." I do not wonder that such a meagre exposition should not have carried with it the highest minds of the age, which turned more eagerly towards the German speculators, and towards Cole ridge, Cousin, and Hamilton.But his book has had its influence over the school to which he belonged, including Mr.Grote, and over certain physiologists, who, if they have only sensations and copies of sensations to account for, are tempted to imagine that they can explain them all by organic processes.His son, John Stuart, and Mr.Bain, have been greatly swayed by the elder Mill, but have clearly perceived the enormous defects of the analysis, which they have sought to rectify in the valuable edition of the work published in it; the fundamental defects however remain, and the corrections admit principles which these authors have not dared to avow or to carry out, as they involve so many other mental operations beyond sensations and ideas.
In Chap.III.he goes on to his favorite subject, association of ideas.Ideas have a synchronous and a successive order.When sensations have occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically,"and thus he fashions many of our complex ideas, as of a violin with a certain figure and tone.He resolves the ideas of successive associations into the one {381} law of contiguity.This resolution has been criticised by Hamilton (" Reid's Collected Works " Note D.... 2), and also by his son (Note to Chap.III.), who endeavor to show that the suggestion of similars cannot be thus accounted for, which they certainly cannot be unless we call in some intermediate processes.He shows how, by these associations, we get certain complex ideas, as the ideas of metals from the separate ideas of several sensations, -- color, hardness, extension, weight.In illustrating this point, he says, that " philosophy has ascertained that we draw nothing from the eye whatever but sensations of color." In opposition to this, Hamilton has demonstrated that, if we perceive color, we must also perceive the line that separates one color from another (Met.Lect.27).The result he has reached is summed up: "We have seen first that we have sensations secondly, that we have ideas, the copies of these sensations thirdly, that those ideas are sometimes simple, the copies of one sensation; sometimes complex, the copies of several sensations so combined as to appear not several ideas but one idea and, fourthly, that we have trains of these ideas, or one succeeding another without end."He turns to naming (Chap.IV.), and treats of the various parts of speech, but throws little light on them.He goes on to explain the various processes of the mind, beginning with consciousness (Chap.V.)." To say I feel a sensation, is merely to say I feel a feeling, which is an impropriety of speech; and to say I am conscious of a feeling is merely to say that I feel it.To have a feeling is to be conscious, and to be conscious is to have a feeling." "In the very word 'feeling' all that is implied in the word 'consciousness' is involved." There is a palpable oversight here.When I feel a sensation it is of a sensitive organ as affected, and knowledge is involved in this.To be conscious is to know self as feeling or in some other state.
" When I smell a rose, I am conscious." True, but I am conscious not of the rose, but of self as having the sensation.In explaining consciousness, he overlooks the very peculiarity of the thing to be explained.
He then (Chap.V., VI., VII., VIII., IX.) treats of conception, imagination, classification, abstraction."Conception applies only to ideas and to ideas only in a state of combination.It is a general name, including the several classes of complex {382} ideas." But the question arises, What intellectual bond combines things generally?