On this second point， the evidence was scarcely less. - And clearly， the moment the local powers owed their appointment to the central powers， it is plain that the central executive power， on which they depend， should be unique. For， this great team of functionaries， driven from aloft， could not have aloft several distinct drivers；being several and distinct， the drivers would each pull his own way， while the horses， pulling in opposite directions， would do nothing but prance. In this respect the combinations of Sieyès do not bear examination. A mere theorist and charged with preparing the plan of a new constitution， he had reasoned as if the drivers on the box were not men， but robots： perched above all， a grand-elector， a show sovereign， with two places to dispose of and always passive， except to appoint or revoke two active sovereigns， the two governing consuls.
One， a peace-consul， appointing all civil officers， and the other a war-consul， making all military and diplomatic appointments； each with his own ministers， his own council of state， his own court of judicature. All these functionaries， ministers， consuls， and the grand-elector himself， were revocable at the will of a senate which from day to day could absorb them， that is to say， make them senators with a salary of 30，000 francs and an embroidered dress-coat.[8]
Sieyès evidently had not taken into account either the work to be done or the men who would have to do it， while Bonaparte， who was doing the work at this very time， who understood men and who understood himself， at once put his finger on the weak spot of this complex mechanism， so badly adjusted and so frail. Two consuls，[9] "one controlling the ministers of justice， of the interior， of the police， of the treasury， and the other the ministers of war， of the navy， and of foreign affairs." The conflict between them is certain； look at them facing each other， subject to contrary influences and suggestions： around the former "only judges， administrators， financiers， and men in long robes，" and round the latter "only epaulets and men of the sword."Certainly "one will need money and recruits for his army which the other will not grant." - And it is not your grand-elector who will make them agree. "If he conforms strictly to the functions which you assign to him he will be the mere ghost， the fleshless phantom of a roi fainéant. Do you know any man vile enough to take part in such contrivances？ How can you imagine any man of talent or at all honorable contentedly playing the part of a hog fattening himself on a few millions？" - And all the more because if he wants to abandon his part the door stands open. "Were I the grand-elector I would say to the war-consul and to the peace-consul on appointing them， If you put in a minister or sign a bill I don't like I'll put you out." Thus does the grand-elector become an active， absolute monarch.
"But，" you may say， "the senate in its turn will absorb the grand-elector." - " The remedy is worse than the disease； nobody， according to this plan， has any guarantees，" and each， therefore， will try to secure them to himself， the grand-elector against the senate， the consuls against the grand-elector， and the senate against the grand-elector and consuls combined， each uneasy， alarmed， threatened， threatening， and usurping to protect himself； these are the wheels which work the wrong way， in a machine constantly getting out of order， stopping， and finally breaking down entirely.
Thereupon， and as Bonaparte， moreover， was already master， all the executive powers were reduced to one， and this power was vested in him.[10] In reality， "to humor republican opinion"[11] they gave him two associates with the same title as his own； but they were appointed only for show， simply as consulting， inferior， and docile registrars， with no rights save that of signing their names after his and putting their signatures to the procès verbal declaring his orders； he alone commanded， "he alone had the say， he alone appointed to all offices，"so that they were already subjects as he alone was already the sovereign.
VI. Irreconcilable divisions.
Difficulty of organizing a legislative power. - Fraudulent and violent elections for ten years. - Spirit and diffusion of hatred against the men and dogmas of the Revolution. - Probable composition of a freely elected Assembly. - Its two irreconcilable divisions. - Sentiments of the army. - Proximity and probable meaning of a new coup d'état.