Thus the liberal constitution， at its close， gave birth to a centralized despotism， and this was the worst of its species， at once formless and monstrous； for it was born out of a civil crime， while the government which used it had no support but a band of bigoted fanatics or political adventurers； without any legal authority over the nation， or any moral hold on the army， detested， threatened， discordant， exposed to the resistance of its own upholders， to the treachery of its own members， and living only from day to day， it could maintain itself only through a brutal absolutism and permanent terror， while the public power of which the first care is the protection of property， consciences， and lives， became in its hands the worst of persecutors， robbers， and murderers.
III.
In 1799， the undertaking is more difficult and the materials worse.
Twice in succession had the experiment been tried， the monarchical constitution of 1791， and the republican constitution of 1795； twice in succession had the same events followed the same course to attain the same end； twice in succession had the theoretical， cunningly-devised machine for universal protection changed into an efficient and brutal machine for universal oppression. It is evident that if the same machine were started the third time under analogous conditions， one might expect to see it work in the same manner； that is to say， contrary to its purpose.
Now， in 1799， the conditions were analogous， and even worse， for the work which the machine had to do was not less， while the human materials available for its construction were not so good. -Externally， the country was constantly at war with Europe； peace could not be secured except by great military effort， and peace was as difficult to preserve as to win. The European equilibrium had been too greatly disturbed； neighboring or rival States had suffered too much；the rancor and distrust provoked by the invading revolutionary republic were too active； these would have lasted a long time against pacified France even after she had concluded reasonable treaties. Even should she abandon a policy of propaganda and interference， return brilliant acquisitions， cease the domination of protectorates， and abandon the disguised annexation of Italy， Holland， and Switzerland， the nation was still bound to keep watch under arms. A government able to concentrate all its forces - that is to say， placed above and beyond all dispute and promptly obeyed-was indispensable， if only to remain intact and complete， to keep Belgium and the frontier of the Rhine. - Likewise internally， and for no other purpose than to restore civil order； for here， too， the outrages of the Revolution had been too great. There had been too much spoliation， too many imprisonments， exiles， and murders， too many violations of every kind， too many invasions of the rights of property and of persons， public and private. It was so much more difficult* To insure respect for persons and all private and public possessions；* to restrain at once both Royalists and Jacobins；* to restore 140，000 émigrés to their country and yet satisfy 1，200，000 possessors of national property；* to give back to 25，000，000 of orthodox Catholics the right， faculty， and means for worshipping， and yet not allow the schismatic clergy to be maltreated；* to bring face to face in the same commune the dispossessed seigneur and the peasant holders of his domain；* to compel the delegates of the Committee of Public Safety and their victims， the shooters and the shot of Vendémiaire， the Fructidorians and the Fructidorized， the Whites and the Blues of La Vendée and Brittany， to live in peace side by side，because the future laborers in this immense work， from the village mayor to the state-senator and state-councilor， had borne a part in the Revolution， either in effecting it or under subjection to it -Monarchists， Feuillantists， Girondists， Montagnards， Thermidorians， moderate Jacobins or desperate Jacobins， all oppressed in turn and disappointed in their calculations. Their passions， under this régime， had become embittered； each brought personal bias and resentment into the performance of his duties； to prevent him from being unjust and mischievous demanded a tightened curb.[3] All sense of conviction， under this régime， had died out； no body would serve gratis as in 1789；[4] nobody would work without pay； disinterestedness had lost all charm； ostentatious zeal seemed hypocrisy； genuine zeal seemed self-dupery； each looked out for himself and not for the community； public spirit had yielded to indifference， to egotism， and to the need of security， of enjoyment， and of self-advancement. Human materials， deteriorated by the Revolution， were less than ever suited to providing citizens - they simply furnished functionaries. With such wheels combined together according to formula current between 1791 and 1795， the requisite work could not possibly be done. As a consequence， definitely and for a long time， any use of the two great liberal mechanisms were doomed. So long as the wheels remained of such poor quality and the task so hard， both the election of local powers and the division of the central power had to be abandoned.
IV.
Motives for suppressing the election of local powers. - The Electors.
- Their egoism and partiality. - The Elected. - Their inertia， corruption， and disobedience.